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Piloting a commercial aircraft involves performing multiple tasks in a real-time
environment that require pilot's attention and cognitive resource allocation. Due to resource
limitation, pilots must perform cockpit task management (CTM) because they cannot perform
all tasks that demand their attention at once. Hence, pilots must prioritize the tasks in the order
of most to least important and allocate their resources according to this prioritization.
Over the years, pilots have developed rules of thumb for task prioritization in
facilitating CTM. A task prioritization error is simply an error made by the flight crew when
they perform lower priority tasks as opposed to higher priority tasks, where priority is
determined by the Aviate-Navigate-Communicate-Manage Systems (A-N-C-S) task ordering.
Although the level of flight deck automation has been suggested as one factor
influencing the likelihood of task prioritization errors, there has so far been just one study
directed towards confirming that hypothesis. Hence the first objective of this study was to
determine the effect of the level of automation on CTM performance. CTM performance was
measured by looking at the number of task prioritization errors committed by pilots in
different levels of automation. In addition to the level of automation, there was also reason to
believe that the pilot's automation proficiency might affect CTM performance. Therefore, the
second objective of this study was to determine the effect of automation proficiency on CTM
performance.
Nine airline transport pilots served as subjects in this study. Three flying scenarios
and three levels of flight deck automation were simulated on a part-task flight simulator. Each
pilot ran three different combinations of flight deck automation and flying scenario. The CTM
performance for each pilot was determined by identifying the number of task prioritization
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
According to Boeing's statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents, flight
crew errors accounted for 70% of the 149hull loss accidents with known causes in the
worldwide commercial jet fleet throughout the period of 1988-1997. hi earlierstudies
completed at Oregon State, we have determined that a significant numberof the errors that led
to these accidents were related to task prioritization.In a dynamic and complex commercial
cockpit environment, flight crews are often required to accomplish multipletasks concurrently
with a limited quantity of attention. An attention allocation or taskprioritization error is
simply an error made by a flight crew when they perform lower prioritytasks, as opposed to
higher priority tasks, where priority is determined in part by the Aviate,Navigate,
Communicate, and Manage Systems (A-N-C-S) task ordering. Although levelof automation
has been suggested as one factor influencing the likelihood of taskprioritization errors, there
has so far been just one study directed toward confirming thathypothesis.
Wilson and Funk (1998) addressed the relationship between task management(TM)
of commercial airline pilots and the level of automation on the flightdeck by determining how
automation affects the frequency of task prioritization errors, as reportedin Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports. hi this study, they found thatthe frequency of task
prioritization errors was significantly greater in advanced technologyaircraft incident reports
(i.e., higher level of automation) than in traditional aircraft incident reports(i.e., lower level of
automation). While this is a potentially significant finding, there are somedrawbacks to
determining the effect of automation on the frequency of taskprioritization errors based solely
on ASRS incident reports. For example,these reports were based on narratives of pilots who
voluntarily reported the incidents. Therefore, not all incidents involvingautomation are
reported and the narratives are likely to reflect the biases of the reporter.Hence the need of
determining the effect of level of automation on the frequency of taskprioritization errors in a
more controlled environmentinitiated the idea of this study. In addition to the level of flight2
deck automation, the automation proficiency factor was also investigated as apossible factor
that may affect task management performance, as suggested by Funk et al.(1999).
While the ideal environment for conducting such a study would be in a full-mission
simulator, budget and time precluded this option. On the other hand, an abstractlaboratory
setting would lack the fidelity to achieve at least face validity and the results of such a study
could not be extrapolated to the real flight deck. Instead, a part-task simulatorstudy was
conducted. This provided a compromise between the extremes mentioned above andlaid the
groundwork for future full-mission simulator studies.
1.2 Research Objectives
The objectives of this research were to investigate the following factors that may
affect CTM performance: 1. differences in level of flight deck automation; 2.differences in
pilots' automation proficiency.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
Chapter 2 consists of the literature review necessary for understanding this thesis.This
chapter includes an overview of two major lines of research, flight deckautomation issues
research and cockpit task management (CTM) research.
Chapter 3 outlines the linkage between flight deck automation and CTM includingthe
motivations and objectives of this research.
The description of research methodology and results of the research are presented in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively. In addition, Chapter 5 also describes theanalysis of the
results and the potential contributions of this research.
A brief discussion on findings and limitations of the research is written in Chapter6.
Finally, in Chapter 7 the summary and conclusions of the research and recommendationsfor
future research are presented.2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 Issues and Research on Flight Deck Automation
2.1.1 Aircraft Automation Technology
Automating the commercial transport aircraft flight deck is feasible due tothe rapid
growth of advanced microprocessor technology and display systems.These days, human can
build sophisticated automated systems that have the ability to performtasks that in the past
have been performed only by human pilots. These systems include theadvanced autopilot, the
Flight Management System (FMS), electronic instrument displays,advanced warning and
alerting systems, and advanced navigation systems.
The advanced autopilot helps human pilots in controlling the aircraft'saltitude,
heading, and speed as selected by the pilots. Its main purpose is torelieve the pilot of the
control of the aircraft during long periods of flight.
The FMS, known as the primary equipment of flight deck automation,forms an
integrated full-flight regime control and information system which providesautomatic
navigation, guidance, map display, and in-flight performance optimization.The FMS is also
useful in performing many routine tasks and computations normallyperformed by the flight
crew.
2.1.2 General Concerns About Automation
The fact that flight deck automation has improved aircraft performanceand reliability
is very pleasing. Although it has generally been well received by pilots,aviation safety
experts, and the aviation industry, the advent ofadvanced technology, the so called "glass
cockpit," on commercial transport aircraft has raised several concerns (e.g.,Billings, 1997;
Satter & Woods, 1995; Wise et al., 1993; Wiener, 1989).These concerns include the
possibility that automation may increase pilot workload, that pilots maylack an understanding
of automation, and that automation may be too complex.
These concerns are due to the fact that automation changes the nature ofthe pilot's
role on the flight deck. Pilots become system managers who are monitoring systemsand who
step in only when changes are necessary or whenunanticipated situations occur (Billings,4
1991). Instead of hand flying the aircraft, pilots control the aircraft throughautomation
interfaces. Essentially, this may remove the pilot from the control loop, decreasing system
awareness, especially if feedback on automation statusand behavior is limited (Sailer &
Woods, 1991).
Another concern with flight deck automation technology is that the automation may
be at the same time eliminating and producing errors; that certain types of errors are reduced,
and others are enabled (Wiener, 1989). Wiener referred to this as "enabling" errors, which
include both creating the possibility for new errors that did not exist previously and increasing
the frequency of errors that already existed. An example of this is a gross navigational error
that contributed to the American Airlines flight 965 accident near Cali, Colombia. It was
determined that the flightcrew had mistakenly programmed an identifier 'R' as Rozo instead of
Romeo beacon into the system (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia, 1997). This
mistake caused the aircraft to turn into high mountainous terrain, and shortly after the turnthe
aircraft struck the side of the mountain, causing 159 fatalities.
2.1.3 Automation Effects on Pilot's Workload
Wiener (1989) argued that the promise of automation in reducing overall flight crew
workload cannot be justified. Workload appears to have decreased during low workload
periods (e.g., in a cruise phase of flight), but to have increased during high workload periods
(e.g., in a landing phase of flight). In his study, he found that numerous pilots stressedthe
importance of management of workload, and of planning ahead. Pilots stated that entering the
winds into the FMS can easily be done in the non-critical phase of flight (i.e., cruise) before
top of descent (TOD). This would reduce the pilot's workload in adjustingthe aircraft attitudes
to the wind by letting the automation perform the task. On the otherhand, pilots experienced
an increase in workload when they encounter rapidair traffic controller (ATC) route changes,
crossing restrictions, and runway changes. Many pilots spend excessive time trying to solve
problems with FMS programming rather than by hand flying the aircraft. Clearly, automation
does have an impact on the flight crew's workload.
2.1.4 Automation Attentional Demand
Funk et al. (1999) compiled a list of 92 issues about automation on the flight deck
from various sources, including accident reports, incident reports, surveys, and experiment5
studies. They compiled a database of both supporting and contradictory evidence that
addresses these issues to determine which of these issues should be valid concerns. For each
instance of this evidence, they qualitatively assessed the extent to which it supported one side
of the issue or the other, and assigned a numeric strength rating between -5 and +5. They
assigned a positive strength rating to evidence supporting that side of the issue suggested by
its issue statement (supportive evidence) and a negative strength rating to evidence supporting
the other side (contradictory evidence). They also conducted a meta-analysis of this evidence
to identify issues that are problems in need of solutions, issues that do not appear to be
problems, and issues that require more research. The meta-analysis was performed by ranking
the issues based on the following criteria: number of citations from people's perceptions of
problems and their concerns about automation, a qualitative survey of automation experts'
agreement ratings, a qualitative survey of automation experts' criticality ratings, and a sum of
strengths of all evidence.
In general, they considered that issues with the greatest overall contradictory evidence
are not significant problems, and resources would be better used in solvingreal problems.
However, there were possible exceptions to this:
issue079: Automation may increase overall pilot workload, or increase pilot workload
at high workload times and reduce pilot workload at low workload times,
possibly resulting in excess workload and/or boredom.
This issue ranked high in number of citations collected in Phase 1. It indicates that
there is strong feeling that automation does increase workload in certain flight phases, which
therefore poses a safety hazard. However, in defiance of the common linking of workload to
attention this issue is also ranked second in overall contradictory evidence i.e., second lowest
in suppt)rtive evidence. This contradiction may be explained by considering the evidence
about attentional demands separately from overall workload. Perhaps, the ill-definition of the
term workload may have masked the real problem of this issue.
Along those same lines, they believed those issues with the greatest overall supportive
evidence, and especially those issues ranking highest in multiple criteria, to indicate real
problems which require solutions. Resources should be dedicated to finding those solutions.
The highest ranked issue in multiple criteria, issue102, is as follows:
issue102: The attentional demands of pilot-automation interaction may significantly
interfere with performance of safety-critical tasks.6
There was strong evidence and agreement that automation can and often doesdraw
pilot attention away from safety-critical flight control tasks. Therefore, knowing thefact that
there is a seeming paradox between the workload issue (issue079) and the attentionaldemand
issue (issue102), several questions have been raised: What is "attentional demand"?What is
"workload"? Is "attentional demand" the real problem here?
2.2 Attention and Workload
In everyday conversation, we often use the word "attention" to include severalkinds
of mental activities. Attention can refer to the kind of concentration on amental task in which
the human selects certain kinds of perceptual stimuli for further processing,while trying to
exclude other interfering stimuli (Shapiro, 1984).
In an effort to understand the pilots' performance on the flight deck, research inthe
area of human cognitive processing capabilitiesand limitations was explored. Some of the
theories of attention and time-sharing are presented next.
2.2.1 Single Resource Theory
Wickens (1992) and Kahneman (1973) hypothesized that the human information
processing system is composed of one reservoir/pool of resources available to alltasks and
mental activities. They described attention as a flexible, shamble, processing resourceof
limited availability needed for humans to perform multiple tasks simultaneously.However,
Single Resource Theory cannot account for several aspects of the data from dual-task
interference studies (Wickens, 1984). The first aspect, difficulty-structure uncoupling,is the
situation in which two tasks of differing difficulty are each paired with anothertask (third
task) and of these two tasks, the easier task interferes with the third task the most.The second
aspect is difficulty insensitivity. It refers to the situationin which a demand or difficulty
increase of a primary task does not reduce the performance of a secondarytask. Perfect time
sharing refers to the situation in which two tasks that are both clearlyattention demanding can
be performed together successfully. The fourth and last aspect, structuralalteration effects,
refers to the differences in the amount of interference or the degree ofdifficulty performance
trade-off when the structure or processing mechanism of one of the paired tasksis altered.7
2.2.2 Performance Resource Function (PRF)
Norman and Bobrow (1975) introduced the concept of the performance resource
function to illustrate how the amount of attention (i.e., resource) allocated to a task affects the
quality of the task's performance. There are two types of processing limitations that humans
can experience when performing a task, data-limited and resource-limited. The task is said to
be data-limited when it is not possible to improve the performance beyond a certain point (the
region to the right of point C in Figure 2.1) due to the quality of the data. When performance
does change by adding resources or taking out resources, the task is said to be resource-limited
(the region to the left of point C in Figure 2.1). Single task performance is best when all
resources are invested in the task (Point A). Point B represents a lower quality performance
due to diverting a large amount of resources away from the task.
Resource-iited
C
Data-limited
100%
Resources allocated
Figure adapted from Norman & Bobrow (1975).
Figure 2.1 Performance Resource Function (PRF).
2.2.3 Performance Operating Characteristic (POC)
The performance operating characteristic (POC), or allocation of resources, has been
used to describe a number of characteristics of two time-shared tasks that can be performed
together by allocating resources (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Figure 2.2 shows two resource-
limited tasks (A and B) with three allocation policies. Point P represents perfect time sharing
single-task performance. If two tasks are being performed at the same time using the same
resource, one of the tasks must sacrifice its performance to improve performance on the other8
task. This condition creates a cost of concurrence, which simply explainswhy the single task
points are higher (better performance) than the points on the curve as shown onthe figure. The
shape of the curve is determined by the amount of improvement that can begained in one task
by sacrificing the performance of the second task (Navon & Gopher, 1979).
Single
Task A
Cost of
Occurence
Dual Task
A
Dual Task
B
Single
Task B
Quality of performance B
Figure adapted from Wickens (1992).
Figure 2.2 Performance Operating Characteristics (POC).
2.2.4 Task. Demand (Difficulty) and Automaticity
Kahneman (1973) proposed that there is a single undifferentiated pool of resources of
human attention available to all tasks and mental activities. He also stated that as taskdemand
increases, either by making a given task more difficult or by imposing additional tasks, a
physiological arousal mechanism produces an increase in the supply of resources.Performance
Resources
9
Figure adapted from Wickens (1992).
Figure 2.3 PRF and practice. Task A: unpracticed or difficult; Task B:practiced or easy.
As shown in Figure 2.3, in a "two tasks performed simultaneously"condition, a task
which received more practice(B),being more automatic, demands fewer resources to reach
performance levels that are equivalent to the other task (A). Althoughtask B has a greater
data-limited region, it may not necessarily be performed better thantask A if full resources are
invested into A, but simply will be performed at that levelwith more spare capacity. This
implication of the differences between two performance resourcefunctions is realized only
when the primary task (i.e., the task of interest) is time-sharedwith a concurrent task
(secondary task).
2.2.5 Multiple Resource Theory
Multiple Resource Theory declares that instead of one single supply of
undifferentiated resources, people have several different capacities with resourceproperties.
Wickens (1984, 1992) has argued that resources may be defined bythree relatively simple
dichotomous dimensions: two stage-defined resources (early versus lateprocesses), two
modality-defined resources (auditory versus visual encoding), and two resourcesdefined by
processing codes (spatial versus verbal). Figure 2.4 shows theproposed structure of
processing resources by Wickens.Visual
73
Spati
CodesVerba
10
.----- Processing Stages
Perceptual
Encodi
Central
Processing
Responses
Vocal\
Figure adapted from Wickens (1992).
Figure 2.4 The proposed structure of processing resources by Wickens
Wickens says that the resources used for perceptual and central-processing activities
appear to be the same, but they are functionally separate from selectionand execution of
responses. This assertion is proved with the fact that performance of a concurrenttask whose
demands are more perceptual in nature is unchanged when the difficulty of responding in a
task is varied. Shallice, McLeod, and Lewis (1985) examined dual-task performance on a
series of tasks involving speech recognition (perception) and production (response) and
concluded that the resources underlying these two processes are separate. Perceptual
modalities refer to separate functional resources used in interpreting audio and/or visual.
objects. Wickens pointed out that people can sometimes divide attention between the eye and
ear (cross-modal time-sharing) better than between two auditory channels or twovisual
channels (intramodal time sharing). However, he concluded that the relative advantage of
cross-modal over intramodal time sharing may not really be the result of separate perceptual
resources, but rather the result of peripheral interference manipulations. Thethird resources
dimension, processing codes, means that processing that is coded spatially requires a different
resource than processing that is coded verbally. When manual and vocal outputs canbe time-
shared, where manual responses are usually spatial in nature, and vocal responses verbal, the
separation of spatial and verbal resources explains the fact of having a high degree of
efficiency in performing tasks.11
Unlike Single Resource Theory, Multiple Resource Theory is able to accountfor the
four limitations described above. According to Wickens, difficulty insensitivityand perfect
time sharing aspects can be eliminated when the resources required do not overlap.Structural
alteration effects can be avoided by structuring the tasks so that they both useoverlapping
processing resources. Interference between tasks would not occur unless the capacityof shared
resources was exceeded. Difficulty-structure uncoupling canbe explained by having separate
resources for the more difficult task and for acombination of the easier of the two tasks and
the third task. In this way, the more difficult task would not compete for the same resources
used by other tasks.
2.2.6 Summary
In summary, attention can be defined as the concentration of mental effort on sensory
or mental events. Once an external stimulusis detected, a resource is needed to sense and
process the stimulus. For example, listening tomusic requires one or more resources to
understand and enjoy the music being listened to. The need of allocating a resourceis also
called attentional demand, or workload. However, human neurologicalcapacity is limited in
sensing all external stimuli. Even when these stimuli are detected, the humanbrain would not
be able to process all of them simultaneously due to the limitation of itsinformation-
processing capacity.
2.3 Cockpit Task Management (CTM)
Piloting a commercial transport aircraft involves performance of multiple tasks in a
real-time environment that require the pilot's attention and cognitive resourceallocation. Funk
(1991) defined cockpit task management (CTM) as a function in which thepilot manages
his/her available sensory and mental resources in a dynamic, complex, safetycritical
environment in order to accomplish the multiple tasks competing for the limited quantityof
attention. This function includes creating an agenda of tasks to perform, assessing the
situation, activating tasks, assessing progress and status of active tasks, terminatingtasks,
assessing task resource requirements, prioritizing tasks, allocating resources, and updatingthe
agenda (Funk, 1991). The reason that pilots must perform CTM is because they cannot
perform all tasks that demand their attention due to resource limitations as defined inMultiple12
Resource Theory. Hence, pilots must prioritize the tasks in the order of most toleast important
and allocate their resources according to this prioritization.
Over the years, pilots have developed a rule of thumb for task prioritization order in
facilitating CTM. This task prioritization- ordering scheme is also known as the A-N-C-S
hierarchy:
Aviate: keeping the airplane in the air.
Navigate: determining the position of the airplane relative to ground, where the airplane
should go, and how to get there.
Communicate: talking to air traffic controllers over radio and also to other flight crew
members.
Manage systems: monitoring and configuring power plant, fuel, electrical, hydraulic,and
life support systems.
CTM is performed every day by pilots. However, it has been determined that CTM
errors contribute significantly to aircraftincidents and accidents. A kind of CTM error, a task
prioritization error, is simply an error made by the flight crew when they perform lower
priority tasks, as opposed to higher priority tasks, where priority is determined by the A-N-C-
S task ordering. A summary of studies of CTM is presented below.
2.3.1 CTM Errors in Aircraft Accidents
In a real flying situation, CTM errors can have extremely unfavorable consequences,
as seen in several accidents at least partially attributable toCTM errors. A well-known
example was the Eastern Air Lines Lockheed L-1011 accident near Miami (NTSB, 1973).It
has been determined that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilots to
maintain the aircraft's altitude; instead of maintaining altitude the crew was troubleshooting a
malfunctioning landing gear problem. This is an example of poor CTM. The flight crew
committed a CTM error because the lower priority task of troubleshooting themalfunctioning
landing gear indicator was allocated attention, while the higher priority task of maintaining the
aircraft's altitude was not allocated appropriate attention.
Chou (1991) hypothesized that CTM errors contribute to a significant number of
aircraft accidents. He reviewed 324 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)accident
reports and interpreted the NTSB findings into a CTM error taxonomy(Chou and Funk,13
1990). He determined that in76 of 324accident reports, or about23% ofthe aircraft
accidents, CTM errors were committed.
2.3.2 CTM Errors in Aircraft Incidents
Madhavan(1993)conducted a similar CTM error study using the Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS). He selected470ASRS incident reports and reviewed them for
CTM errors. He found that231 ofthe 470 incident reports contained CTM errors. The
proportionof CTMerrors in aircraft incidents,49%, isconsidered significant. Three hundred
forty-nine CTM errors were found in the231incidents.
2.3.3 CTM Errors in a Part Task Simulator
In an effort to understand the natureofCTM behavior, Chou (1991) performed a part
task simulator study with the objectiveofeliciting CTM errors in a laboratory environment,
rather than reviewing reports of errors which occured in operational environments. Themain
objectivesofthis study were to elicit and observe CTM errors similar to those identified in the
accident and incident analyses and to identify the factors leading to such errors.
The flight simulator consistedofthree networked personal computers simulating a
generic, two-engine commercial transport aircraft. Twenty-four unpaid subjectsparticipated in
the study and three conditionsofthe flying scenarios were defined: resource or workload
requirements, maximum numberofconcurrent tasks, and flight path complexity. The
performanceofthe subjects was measured by the average time to respond to equipment faults,
the root-mean-square of flight path error, task prioritization score, and the number of tasksthat
were initiated late.
The findings indicated that CTM errors increase with an increase in resource
requirements (i.e., workload). Also, the combination of flight path complexity and number of
concurrent tasks created significant effects on task prioritization.
2.3.4 Workload Management
A study of flight crew task management in non-normal situations was performed by
Schutte and Trujillo (1996) to observe pilots' performance in a full workload environment.14
They observed four differing strategies depending on the individual characteristics of the pilot.
These strategies are as follows:
Aviate-Navigate-Communicate-Manage Systems (A-N-C-S): subjects prioritize their
attention with Aviate as the highest priority and Systems as the lowest priority.
Perceived Severity: subjects place highest priority on what they perceive to be the most
threatening problem.
Procedure Based: subjects migrate towards tasks for which there are well defined
procedures. These range from systems procedures to Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs).
Event/Interrupt (E/I) Driven: subjects' attention is given to a particular task based on an
event or an interruption.
They found that the most useful strategy in dealing with the systems failure was to prioritize
and allocate personal workload based on either the Perceived Severity or the E/I Driven
strategy. Either one of these two strategies resulted in the most effective pilotperformance,
which was measured by number of errors made and the length of time to respond to a system
failure. They also mentioned that the activity of CTM appears to play a significant role in how
the flight crew deals with the non-normal situation and that CTM is largely dependent on
individual differences between flight crews and personal style.
2.3.5 Interruptions/Distractions
Research in attention management (e.g., Broadbent, 1958) indicated that humans do
not handle interruptions easily, or, often, very well. Latorella (1996) performed a study to
investigate the influence of interruptions on performance errors in commercial flight deck
procedure. She found that air traffic controller (ATC) interruptions significantly increased
performance errors in flight deck procedure. In addition, interrupted procedures contained, on
the average, 53% more procedure performance errors than uninterrupted procedures. Although
she also found that interruptions did not degrade the pilot's speed in performing tasks, there is
evidence that ATC interruptions degrade performance on the flight deck and it may
significantly contribute to both aircraft incidents and accidents.
Damos (1997) performed a study to determine the priorities of various events and
activities by looking at patterns of interruptions in air carrier operations. The result of the
study revealed that communications from ATC and airline dispatchers had the highest priority15
compared to the other five event types: appearance of the flight attendant, cabin chimes, voice
communications from the cabin attendant, warning signals, and communications from support
personnel. Another interesting finding from this study is the high relative probability of
interruptions for activities associated with operating and programming the Flight Management
System (FMS) as compared to other procedural activities. These results may provide some
evidence on how the interruptions may affect CTM performance.16
3. LINKAGE BETWEEN FLIGHTDECK AUTOMATION AND
COCKPIT TASK MANAGEMENT
As flight deck automation increases, the attentional demand for tasks associated with
communicating with and managing the automation also increases. While automation provides
additional external resources for the flight crew to utilize, these resources must be managed,
which in turn increases demands on CTM. Hence, it has been speculated that the increase of
automation level may affect CTM performance. A study directed toward confirming this
speculation is discussed next.
3.1 The Effect of Automation on the Frequency of Task PrioritizationErrors
Wilson (1997) conducted an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident
report study to examine the effect of the level of automation onthe rate of task prioritization
errors on the commercial transport flight deck. A totalof 420 randomly selected ASRS reports
were reviewed for task prioritization errors. Twohundred ten of these reports were selected
from aircraft classified as advanced technology (high automation aircraft), and theother 210
from conventional technology, or low automation aircraft. All of these reports were
constrained to reports submitted during the period of 1988 to 1993 and were limited to large
transport commercial jets with two-pilot flight decks. The summary ofthe frequencies of task
prioritization errors in the two types of aircraft is presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Summary of the task prioritization errors.
Submission Period
TaskTribritizatiOnError Fruenc
:Traditional
echno o Technology
Total Errors by
Submission Period
1988-1989
1990-1991
1992-1993
13
11
4
7
5
3
20
16
7
"Tolal Errors by
Aircraft Technology
28 15
Table adapted from Wilson and Funk (1998).17
Not surprisingly, she found that task prioritization errors occurred in both advanced
technology and traditional technology aircraft. But of great interest is the fact that the
frequency of task prioritization errors in the advanced technology aircraft was higher than the
frequency of task prioritization errors in traditional technology aircraft. She also noticed a
downward trend in task prioritization errors based on the submission period effect.
3.2 Research Motivation and Research Objectives
According to Boeing's statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents, flight
crew problems accounted for 70% of the 149 hull loss accidents, with known causes, in the
worldwide commercial jet fleet over the period 1988-1997. It has been determined that a
significant number of the errors that led to these accidents were related to task prioritization
(Chou et al., 1996). The knowledge that flight deck automation has an effect on the frequency
of task prioritization errors has raised the question of why advanced technology aircraft appear
to have a higher frequency of task prioritization errors. Although the level of flight deck
automation has been suggested as one factor influencing the likelihood of task prioritization
errors, so far, Wilson's was the only study directed toward confirming that hypothesis.
Furthermore, her study had some drawbacks in determining the effect of the level of
automation on the frequency of task prioritization error based solely on ASRS incident
reports. Hence the need of determining the effect of level of automation on the frequency of
task prioritization errors in a more controlled environment motivated this study. In addition to
level of flight deck automation, Funk et al. (1999) also suggested automation proficiency as a
possible factor that may affect task management performance. Therefore, the objectives of this
research were to investigate the following factors that may affect CTM performance:
1.Differences in flight deck automation level.
2.Differences in pilot's automation proficiency, measured by 'glass cockpit' hours.
The method used to achieve the above objectives is described in the following chapter.18
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Research Methodology Overview
This chapter is structured in two parts. First, a general description of the flight
simulator and its components, including how subjects interacted with the simulator, is
explained. General and detailed experimental procedures are explained in the second part of
this chapter. These procedures include information on experimental design, subject
qualifications, flying scenarios, CTM challenges, and the method used to measure CTM
performance.
4.2 Part Task Simulator
The flight simulator used for the study was a single-pilot part-task simulator obtained
from the NASA Ames Research Center. This part-task simulator, called the "Stone Soup
Simulator" (SSS), is a non-proprietary version of a full-mission six degree-of-freedom motion
base flight simulator which represents a generic commercial transport aircraft containing
aerodynamics and autoflight controls representative of a Boeing 757-class aircraft coupled
with Boeing 747-400 style 'glass cockpit' flight instruments. A complete description of the
SSS can be found on the internet at: <http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/--johnk/sss/user_guide.txt>. A
single Silicon Graphics Indigo 2 workstation was used to run the simulator. An additional
workstation was used by the experimenter to show duplicate aircraft instrument displays and
to control the experiment remotely. Figure 4.1 shows the overall layout of all flight
instruments and Figure 4.2 shows a screen image of the simulator.20
4.2.1 Primary Flight Display and Horizontal Situation Indicator
The output of the aerodynamics model of the simulated aircraft was depicted on the
SSS display through the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Horizontal Situation Indicator
(HSI) located in the center of the simulator's screen. The PFD is a multi-function electronic
display that presents information of aircraft attitude to the pilot. It features partially
overlapped rotating compass, digital and analog vertical speed (V/S)indicator, digital and
analog airspeed indicator, digital and analog altitude indicator, wide screen artificial horizon
indicator, autopilot mode display, and target speed and altitude values.
The HSI is an electronic navigational display to give pilots navigational information
for the aircraft, such as current position, flight plan, etc. In a typical commercial airplane,
there are five navigational display modes that pilots can select from: VOR, ILS, MLS, MAP,
and PLAN.
In this study, the navigational display mode was set to VOR mode when the subject
ran the experiment with either the low or mediumlevel of automation (Figure 4.3). The VOR
mode provided the subject with the aircraft's current heading, relative position anddirection to
a selected very high frequency omni-directionalradio range (VOR) station, and the relative
distance of the aircraft to a fix or waypoint. A VOR station is a ground-based electronic
navigation aid that transmits very high frequency navigation signals, 360 degrees in azimuth,
oriented from magnetic north. These signals are received by the aircraft navigationequipment
and used to track aircraft position to the VOR station. A fix or a waypoint is a predetermined
geographical position used for route or instrument approach definition, that is defined relative
to a VOR station or in terms of latitude/longitude coordinates. In theVOR mode, once a VOR
station frequency had been selected, the pilot utilized the needle-like symbol to steer the
aircraft to or from the selected VOR station by keeping the needle aligned. This method is the
basic radio navigation system taught to all pilots.27
4.2.4 NAV/COMM
Due to the single-pilot simulator environment, there was only one control interface for
the communication (COMM) radio frequency selector and one control interface for the
navigational (NAV) frequency selector provided. These controls were simulated on the
NAV/COMM interface (Figure 4.11) located on the lower-left of the screen, next to the SFDs.
Subjects changed the NAV/COMM frequency by clicking the left mouse button on the left
half of the brown colored circle to decrease and on the right half of the circle to increase radio
or navigation frequency. A digital readout of the frequency selected was displayed on top of
each of the control interfaces.
Figure 4.11 NAVCOMM interface.
4.2.5 Autof light & Mode Control Panel
The autoflight system consisted of units and components which furnish a means of
automatically controlling the direction, heading, attitude, altitude and speed of the aircraft.
Both the autopilot (A/P) system and the autothrottle (A/T) system are part of the autoflight
system. The autopilot system controls the ailerons, elevators, and rudder of the aircraft,
whereas the autothrottle system controls the engine thrust. Control of the autopilot system was
accomplished through the mode control panel (MCP), as seen in Figure 4.12. For the purpose29
4.2.6 Flight Management System and Control Display Unit
Nowadays, many modern commercial transport aircraft are equipped with
sophisticated equipment called the Flight Management System (FMS). It aids the pilot in areas
of flight planning, navigation, performance management guidance, and flight progress
monitoring. A summary of some of the FMS functions is listed in Table 4.2. Three major
components of the FMS are the flight management computer (FMC), control display unit
(CDU), and navigation display unit, also known as HSI (see above). In a typical FMS-
equipped airplane, there are dual or triple FMCs installed and an individual set of CDU and
HSI installed for each pilot. Pilots interact with the FMS through the CDU, which provides a
keyboard for data entry and alphanumeric display of information. The CDU is shown in
Figure 4.13.
Table 4.2 Summary of some of the functions performed by the FMS.
Function Description
Navigation Determination of position, velocity, and wind.
Performance Trajectory determination, definition of guidance and
control targets, flight path predictions as well as time
and fuel at destination.
Guidance Error determination, steering and control command
generation.
Computation of map and situation data for display. Electronic Instrument System
Control and Display Unit (CDU)Processing of keystrokes, flight plan construction, and
presentation of performance and flight plan data.
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Figure 4.13 CDU interface.
The principal capabilities provided by the FMS are continuous, automatic navigation
and inflight performance optimization. The FMS is structured for selective degrees of
assistance at the pilot's option. A typical use of the FMS is to aid the pilot in constructing a
flight plan and navigating the aircraft according to the programmed flight plan. Pilots enter
parameters into the FMS including origin airport, destination airport, and all VORs,
waypoints/fixes along a flight route. The information entered is automatically processed and a
flight route is displayed on the navigational unit display (HSI). Pilots then verify the flight
plan constructed and make necessary changes, if needed. By coupling the FMS with the
autopilot system, using LNAV or VNAV modes, the aircraft can be flown automatically by
computer ostensibly to ease pilot workload and enhance safety.
4.2.7 Subject Tasks
All participants in this study flew three different flights with three different flight deck
automation levels, i.e. low, medium, and high levels of automation. Each of these levels of31
automation was...defined in such a way as to represent a similar automation functionality that
one could find in a real tlight deck. The differences and the availabilityof flight deck
equipment among the three levels of automation are described as follows:
4.2.7.1 Low Automation
In the low level of automation, subjects flew the aircraft with the use of a joystick,
using 'raw data' procedures. Raw data flying means the pilot flies and controls lateral and
vertical movement of the aircraft with a joystick and navigates using VOR/DME navigation
equipment. They did this by tuning in the navigation frequency and flying the aircraft from
one fix to another by centering the needle on the HSI display. Therefore, there were noflight
path management activities involved because FMS was not used.
4.2.7.2 Medium Automation
In this level of automation, subjects were no longer flying the aircraft with the use of a
joystick. Instead, they utilized the altitude selector, vertical speed selector, and heading select
switch on the MCP to control lateral and vertical movement of the aircraft. Although subjects
were required to use the autopilot systems (i.e., heading hold,altitude hold, or vertical speed
hold modes), the-navigation procedure used was the same method of centering the needle on
the HSI display. Cockpit displays were the =le as in the low automation condition and there
were no flight path management activities involved. In summary, the onlydifference between
low and medium automation was the use of the autopilot_ system to control altitude, heading,
and vertical speed on the MCP as opposed to the use of a joystick.
4.2.7.3 High Automation
In addition to using the autopilot system, subjects were also asked to use the FMS to
program a flight plan and modify the plan as necessary throughout the flight.Subjects were
also provided with a moving map display on the HSI to help them navigate. Generally, the
subject acted as a ibutton-pusher' due to the highly automated environment. Unlike the other
two levels of automation, there was an additional display of the CDU.32
4.2.7.4 Aircraft Subsystem Malfu nctions and Fault Correction Procedures
Regardless of the level of automation use, all subjects experienced a set of unexpected
aircraft equipment malfunctions initiated by the experimenter. Pilots utilized non-normal
procedure checklists to guide them in performing fault correction procedures. All possible
aircraft subsystem malfunctions and the associated non-normal checklists are presented in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Aircraft equipment malfunction events and non-normal checklists.
Malfunction Non-nortnal'ehecklist*
Line Contactor Off Line Contactor Cycle to ON
Bus Tie Contactor Off Bus Tie Switch
Line Contactor
Cycle to ON
Check ON
L/R Pack Failure Failed L/R Pack Cycle to ON
L/R Motor Compressor Failure L/R Compressor Motor
Circuit Breaker
Cycle to ON
Cycle to ON DC 270V Failure
Boost Pump Failure Failed Fuel Pump(s) Cycle to ON
Fuel Imbalance Isolation Valves
Low Fuel Pump(s)
Switch to ON
Cycle to OFF
*Contents were adapted from B-757 Operations Manual.
4.2.7.5 Summary of Subject Task s
A summary of tasks is presented in Table 4.4.33
Table 4.4 Summary of tasks based on the A-N-C-S task ordering.
. ... _ .__._
Low Move joystick (forward or backward) and adjust throttle to reach a commanded
altitude.
Move joystick (left or right) to reach a commanded heading.
Medium
and High
Change altitude window value on MCP and adjust throttle to reach a commanded
altitude.
Change heading window value on MCP to reach a commanded heading.
All Control airspeed by setting throttle (EPR value) with mouse controller.
Fl the ai 'lane alon: an airway_ path or to a desired fix/heading.
NaVfia
-...,::--;-., '":-e,--' =
High Program/re-program FMS to accommodate route changes.
All Refer to chart.
Check aircraft's position through distance measuring equipment (DME).
Check aircraft's horizontal direction to/from any point (bearing).
Set navigational equipment (VOR) frequency and/or radial, as required.
Communicate
All Listen to and acknowledge ATC clearances.
Change COMM frequency with mouse controller.
Manage S stems _
All ICorrect an aircraft system malfunction.
4.3 The Experiment
4.3.1 Experimental Design
The general approach to planning and conducting an experiment is called the strategy
of experimentation, or experimental design (Montgomery, 1997). There are several strategies
that an experimenter could use in doing the experiment to achieve his/her objectives. The
strategy used to conduct this study is described in the following section.
4.3.1.1 General Description
The objective of this study was to determine whether different levels of automation
and automation proficiency affect CTM performance. In order to achieve this objective, the
task prioritization error means at different levels of automation and automation proficiency
were compared. According to Ramsey (1997), a method called analysis ofvariance (ANOVA)34
is the most appropriate tool to answer the question of "are there any differences between any
of the means?" Furthermore, ANOVA is a widely used technique to assess mean differences
by comparing the amounts of variability explained by different sources. Hence, the ANOVA
method was selected as a tool to analyze the data throughout this study.
The number of errors committed by each subject in a flying scenario, expressed as a
fraction, was the dependent variable. The level of automation was defined as a factor or an
independent variable in the ANOVA. In order to avoid a learning effect that could bias the
results of the study, three different flying scenarios were created. Therefore, the flying
scenario was included in the model as an independent variable.
The subject's automation proficiency was assessed by recording his total flying hours
in a 'glass cockpit' or FMS-equipped aircraft. Due to the fact that the experimenter could not
control the subject's number of hours in 'glass cockpit' aircraft, this factor was modeled as a
covariate in the design of the experiment. A covariate is an auxiliary measurement taken on
each unit and is not controlled by the experimenter (Ramsey, 1997). Table 4.5 presents a list
of all variables defined in this study.
Table 4.5 Experiment variables.
Variable e%
L Level of Automation Fixed
SFlying scenario Fixed
H Subject's automation proficiency (hours) Random
E random variation Random
Extraneous variables were also important to this study. They were the fidelity of the
simulator, -complexity of the scenarios, static condition of the simulator, and the subject's level
of motivation to participate in the study.
Both the fidelity of the simulator and the static condition of the simulator were
ignored. This was due to the fact that all subjects used the same simulator and none of them
had used it previously. The three different flying scenarios were included in the model by
choosing three familiar routes with a similar number of flight tasks, a similar number of
aircraft subsystem malfunctions, a similar length of flight path, a similar number of waypoints,
and a similar number of turning angle degrees.35
The linear model used in the design of the experiment is presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 The experiment model.
Yijk=+ Li "I" SjLS#HkEijk
where, i = low, medium, or high
j1, 2, or 3
k = 'glass cockpit' hours
The level of automation, flying scenario, and the order of the experimental runs were
randomized according to Table 4.7. Each of the nine subjects performed the experiment runs
according to their randomly assigned subject number. The purpose of randomly assigningthe
subjects was to randomize the combination of the automation level factor with theflying
scenario factor to each of the subjects.
Table 4.7 Experimental order.
Order
Subject 1 2 3
1, 4, 7 LOW / Scenario 1 MEDIUM / Scenario 2 HIGH / Scenario 3
2, 5, 8 HIGH / Scenario 2 LOW / Scenario 3 MEDIUM / Scenario 1
3, 6, 9 MEDIUM / Scenario 3 HIGH / Scenario 1 LOW / Scenario 2
There were two questions to answer from this study. The first question was "Does
level of automation affect CTM performance?" It can be stated in terms of null andalternate
hypotheses as follows:36
Null hypothesis (Ho): The average number of task prioritization error(s)for each level of
automation is the same.
Alternate hypothesis (H1): The average number of task prioritization error(s)for each level of
automation is NOT the same.
Ho: Pr= :12 = /13
H1 : pi * pjfor at least one pair (i,j)
Where:
pi = average number of task prioritization errorin low automation
p2 = average number of task prioritization errorin medium automation
p3 = average number of task prioritization errorin high automation
i or j = 1,2,3
The second question was "Does automation proficiency affect CTMperformance?" or as
stated in terms of null and alternate hypotheses:
Null hypothesis (Ho): Automation proficiency does NOT affect thenumber of task
prioritization error.
Alternate hypothesis (HI): Automation proficiency does affect the numberof task
prioritization error.
Ho: Pm== tin
H1 : pm* p.for at least one pair (m,n)
Where:
m or n = 1,2,3,...,9
Answers to the two questions above are explained in the next chapter.
4.3.1.2 Participants
A total of nine airline transport pilots (ATP) from a US airline served assubjects. One
general aviation (GA) pilot served as a test' subject to fine-tune the flyingscenarios and data
collection/training procedures. All subjects except the GA pilot had at least 200 hours in FMS-
equipped transport aircraft and at least 1500 hours of total flying time.
4.3.1.3 Flying Scenarios
A flying scenario is a planned flight path with a pre-determined sequenceof activities
and events. In this study, not only aircraft equipment malfunction events but alsoscripts of37
ATC (Air Traffic Control) clearances were included in the scenarios.Throughout all
experimental runs, the experimenter acted as an ATC controller giving clearances tothe
subjects. There were three scenarios in the Northwestern United States airspace and one
training scenario in California airspace. All of the scenarios were developed withthe help of
an active airline transport pilot, a former test pilotfrom Boeing, and a local general aviation
pilot. None of these scenarios required the subjects to take off or to land the aircraft; in other
words, all flights started in the air and ended in the air. Appendix 2 presentsdetails of all
flying scenarios with all initial aircraft parameters such as speed, altitude, and heading.
The training scenario was created to get subjects familiar with the flight simulator and
to introduce them to all possible aircraft equipment malfunction events.This training scenario,
as seen in Figure 4.14, was a flight from San LuisObispo, California (MQO) to San
Francisco, California (SFO) with an en-route diversion to San Jose, California (SJC).
SFO0
Figure 4.14 Training scenario flight route.38
The first scenario, as seen in Figure 4.15, was a flight from Eugene, Oregon (EUG) to
Seattle, Washington (SEA). The initial aircraft position was in the air, on Victor airway 481
(V481) out of Eugene to Corvallis. Just about 5 miles before Corvallis, the ATC controller
(i.e., the experimenter) unexpectedly re-routed the aircraft to a fix/waypoint called CRAAF,
continuing to Newberg, Oregon (UBG) and finally Portland, Oregon (PDX) as a new
destination. Equipment malfunction events included in this scenario were: line contactor
malfunction, right pack malfunction, line contactor and bus tie contactor faults, boost pump
failure, and fuel imbalance.
CRAAF
OLM
Figure 4.15 Eugene, OR (EUG) to Seattle, WA (SEA) flight route.
The second scenario, as seen in Figure 4.16, was a flight from Pasco, Washington
(PSC) to Seattle, Washington (SEA) with an unexpected en-route diversion at Yakima,
Washington (YKM) to a fix/waypoint called THICK. Other than a 270V DC fault, all aircraft
malfunctions in this scenario were similar to the ones in the first scenario.SEA
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Figure 4.16 Pasco, WA (PSC) to Seattle, WA (SEA) flight route.
The third scenario, as seen in Figure 4.17, was a reverse flight path of the first
scenario. The flight plan was from Seattle, Washington (SEA) to Eugene, Oregon (EUG) with
a starting point between Portland, Oregon (PDX) and OSWEG. A complete and detailed
structure of scenarios can be found in Appendix 2.40
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Figure 4.17 Seattle, WA (SEA) to Eugene, OR (EUG) flight route.
4.3.2 CTM Challenges
A CTM challenge was an effort to give the pilot two or more tasks that he/she could
not perform concurrently and satisfactorily and therefore had to prioritize them (i.e., perform
CTM). An example of a CTM challenge appeared in flying scenario 1, where the subject was
cleared to climb to 14,000 feet and at the same time a right pack malfunction occurred. Also,
in flying scenario 2, the subject experienced a failure of the 270 DC power supply at the
moment a clearance to slow down to 240 knots was given.
The status of a task may be satisfactory or unsatisfactory, defined as follows:
Satisfactory: A state where a task's goal has been established and task goal condition(s) are
satisfied or significant progress is being made toward satisfying goal
condition(s).
Unsatisfactory: A state where conditions for satisfactory task status are not fulfilled.
Task status is illustrated in Figure 4.18. Suppose an ATC clearance to climb to 15,000
feet is given. A square dotted line indicates the task is in unsatisfactory status (e.g., before the41
climb is commenced) and a triangle dotted line indicates the task is in satisfactory status (e.g.,
during the climb at the target altitude).
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Figure 4.18 Illustration of satisfactory vs. unsatisfactory task status.
The combination of two different priority tasks with their status resulted in four
possible conditions. The only condition where a task prioritization error occurs is whenever
the status of a higher priority task is unsatisfactory while at the same time a lower priority task
is satisfactory, as illustrated in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8 Table of CT/s,4 challenges
Lower priority task
Satisfactory
Lower priority task
unsatisfactory
OK Higher priority task
Satisfactory
OK
Higher priority task
Unsatisfactory
Error OK42
To simplify the status assessment process, standard conditions were defined based on
the A-N-C-S task ordering systems as follows:
Aviate task:
Airspeed is within 10 knots of a commanded airspeed
Altitude is within 50 feet of a commanded altitude during takeoff/approach
Altitude is within 100 feet of a commanded altitude during cruise
Rate of change or trend of a system or state variable (altitude, speed, or heading) is
moving at an acceptable rate and changing in the proper direction
Navigate task:
The FMS is re-programmed completely to accommodate route changes
Navigational equipment (NAV) frequency and radial settings are as required
DME/bearing value and chart are verified
Communicate task:
COMM frequency is properly set and the pilot is in contact with ATC
Manage the system task:
Aircraft system fault is fixed
4.3.3 The Measures
The only performance measure for the study was the number of task prioritization
errors committed. This number was obtained by carefully examiningthe aircraft's parameters
as recorded by the simulator and carefully reviewing activitiesperformed by the subjects
during the runs as recorded on videotape. Since each of the flying scenarios had a total of 6
CTM challenges, the maximum number of errors that a subject could commit was 6.
To find out the effect of flight deck automation on CTM performance, the mean
numbers of task prioritization error for each level of automation were compared and
differences tested for their significance. The same method was used to see the effect of pilots'
automation proficiency on CTM performance. Further explanation about the results and
analysis of this study is presented in the next chapter.43
4.3.4 Detailed Experimental Procedure
The total time required to do the entire experiment for a single participant was close to
three hours. The first five to ten minutes was used to do an overview of the study, to obtain
informed consent, and to fill out the pre-experiment questionnaire. The informed consent form
was a legal document required by Oregon State University InternalReview Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects to obtain the subject's agreement to participate in the
experiment. A copy of the informed consent form is included in Appendix 3. A pre-
experiment questionnaire was used to collect demographic information to aid users of the
research results in assessing their validity and transferability to practical situations.
Information requested in the pre-experiment questionnaire were subject's seat (captain or first
officer), subject's flying experience, including types of aircraft flown and flying hours,
subject's rating (e.g., private pilot, air transport pilot), subject's level of caffeine consumption
and medication use, and subject's self assessments on flight deck automation knowledge. A
copy of the pre-experiment questionnaire is included in Appendix3.
There were three data collection runs which lasted about forty to fifty minutes each,
with a training session before each run. After each of the experimental runs, a three to five
minutes break session was provided. Table 4.9 provides a list of activities performed by every
subject.
Table 4.9 Details of experimental procedure.
,-gActiAti, : t Lifigtlie,-
5-10 minutes Overview, consent form, pre-experiment questionnaire
Overview of the flight simulator 2-3 minutes
Training (first level of automation) 20-25 minutes
Experimental run #1 (first level of automation) 20-25 minutes
Break 3-5 minutes
Training (second level of automation) 20-25 minutes
Experimental run #2 (second level of automation) 20-25 minutes
Break 3-5 minutes
Training (third level of automation) 20-25 minutes
Experimental run #3 (third level of automation) 20-25 minutes
Post-experiment questionnaire and informal discussion 5-10 minutes
The experiment was then concluded by an informal discussion and the subject filled
out a post-experiment questionnaire. The post-test questionnaire assessed subjective44
preferences by the subjects for the different levels of automation and the suitability and
thoroughness of the training. A copy of the post-test questionnaire is included in Appendix 3.45
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Overview of Results and Analysis
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the study. It includes information
gathered from pre- and post-experiment questionnaires, task prioritization error data, a
description of the analysis tools utilized, and calculations that were performed to analyze the
data.
5.2 Results
The following are information gathered from pre-experiment and post-experiment
questionnaires as well as number task prioritization errors. Analysis of this data and their
interpretations are presented at the end of this chapter.
5.2.1 Pre-Experiment Questionnaire
Three captains and six first officers participated in this study. All of the subjects had
flown a wide variety of aircraft ranging from single-engine general aviation aircraft to twin-
jet-engine FMS-equipped transport aircraft. They were all instrument rated airline transport
pilots. Their average total flying time was 5,633 hours with a standard deviation of 3,068
hours and their average flying time in 'glass cockpit' aircraft (or FMS-equipped aircraft) was
1,894 hours with a standard deviation of 1,389 hours.
None of the subjects were taking any medications that could affect their flying and
decision-making skills when they participated in the study. Although one subject stated that he
consumed one cup of coffee more than usual and two subjects had a little less coffee
consumption than usual, the effect of this factor was considered to be very minimal.
At the end of the pre-experiment questionnaire, they were asked to rate their level of
familiarity with the FMS, advanced autopilot (e.g., heading, altitude, and vertical speed
select), and EICAS. The mean numbers were 3.78, 3.89, and 2.78, respectively on a scale of 0
to 4 (4 means that they are very familiar and they use it veryroutinely). This was an indicator
that a majority of the subjects were not new to advanced technology aircraft equipment (Table
5.1).46
Table 5.1 Summary of subject's familiarity with the advanced technology aircraft equipment.
Flight Management
Systems (FMS)*
Advanced Autopilot (e.g.,
heading, altitude, and
vertical speed select)*
Automated Warning and
Alerting System (e.g.,
EICAS)*
MIN 3 3 1
MAX 4 4 4
MEAN 3.78 3.89 2.78
*0 = not familiar with the system at all
4 = very familiar and use it routinely
5.2.2 Post-Experiment Questionnaire
One of the two major questions asked in the post-experiment questionnaire session
was to assess the suitability and thoroughness of the training. The training wasdesigned to get
the subjects familiar with the flight simulator and to introduce them to all possible aircraft
equipment malfunctions and procedures to fix the malfunctions with the use of non-normal
checklists. All of the subjects who participated in the study felt that they received adequate
training prior to experimental runs.
An interesting outcome was discovered from answers provided by the subjects when
they were asked to rate the overall difficulty of the flying in this experiment, as compared to
their real flying experience, and to explain why they thought so. A majority of the subjects
stated that the flight simulator was somewhat more difficult to control and to interact with.
They were not used to the single-pilot environment on the flight simulator as compared to
multi-crew operation in a real flight. This issue is one of the study limitations discussed in
Chapter 6. A few subjects said that flying with the simulator was easier compared to reality,
due to the absence of wind, turbulence, other traffic, flight attendants, and passengers.
5.2.3 Task Prioritization Errors
The number of task prioritization errors was determined by examining aircraft
parameters and reviewing videotapes. The plots of all parameters of interest were made and
carefully examined to determine if any task prioritization errors occurred. A task prioritization
error occurred in a situation where a higher priority task wasunsatisfactory and a lower
priority task was satisfactory.47
As an example, one subject was cleared by the ATC controller (i.e., the experimenter)
to increase the speed to 250 knots and at the same time the EICAS displayed a line contactor
malfunction message. Clearly, there were two concurrent tasks presented to the subject:
increase speed (an aviate task) and correct the equipment fault (a manage the system task). A
good way to manage the tasks was to satisfy the aviate task first before satisfying the manage
the system task. Hence, the subject should have started to increase the speed to 250 knots
before trying to fix the equipment fault (Figure 5.1). If the subject performed a manage the
system task while the aviate task was unsatisfactory, then a task prioritization error occurred,
as shown in Figure 5.2. It is clear from the graph that the subjectfixed the equipment fault
first as opposed to increasing the airspeed to 250 knots, and therefore the subject committed a
task prioritization error.
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Figure 5.1 An example of good task management.
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Figure 5.2 An example of task prioritization error occurrence.
A total of 11, 13, and 12 task prioritization errors were made across scenarios in nine
low automation experimental runs, nine medium automation experimental runs, and nine high
automation experimental runs, respectively. Each of the experimental runs in each level of
automation had a total of 6 CTM challenges. Therefore, a total of 54 CTM challenges were
Presented to the subjects in each level of automation. Dividing the number of errors committed
over the total number of CTM challenges resulted in the mean number of task prioritization
errors committed in each level of automation, as shown in Table 5.2. A graphical
representation of these mean numbers is also presented in Figure 5.3.Table 5.2 Summary of CTM performance in each level of automation.
Low Automation
Medium
Automation
High
Automation
Number of errors committed 11 13 12
Total error opportunities 54 54 54
Mean of task prioritization
errors committed
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Figure 5.3 CTM performance in each level of automation.
While the mean of task prioritization errors in each level of automation seems to be
similar to one another, the rate of task prioritization errors in different 'glass cockpit' hours
shows more variation. Table 5.3 presents a summary of CTM performance arranged by 'glass
cockpit' hours and Figure 5.4 shows a plot of the data.50
Table 5.3 Summary of CTM performance in different 'glass cockpit' hours.
'Glass Cockpit' Hours
200 900 100014001450230023002500 5000
Number of errors
committed
6 1 4 4 7 4 5 I 4
Total error
18
opportunities*
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 i 18
Mean of task
prioritization
errors committed
0.3330.0560.2220.2220.3890.2220.2770.056 I0.222
Note: *Total error opportunities from 3 scenarios.
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Figure 5.4 Plot of CTM performance in different 'glass cockpit' hours.51
5.3 Analysis of Results
Each subject could produce 0 to 6 task prioritization errors in a single
scenario/automation level treatment. The rate of task prioritization errors for each treatment,
expressed as a fraction, was obtained by dividing the number of errors committed with the
maximum number of errors that a subject could make (6). Since there were only two possible
outcomes on each of the CTM challenges, correct or error, the dependentvariable data
followed the binomial distribution. Due to the nonconstant variances, a data transformation
was needed. According to Montgomery (1997), thearcsin transformation yij = arcsin
SQRT(y0 is appropriate for binomial data expressed in fractions. Therefore, the response
variable in all ANOVA calculations was the arcsin-transformed data.
All ANOVA calculations were performed by utilizing a commercial statistical
analysis software package called Statgraphics Plus. Table 5.4 presents the ANOVA table
computed by Statgraphics Plus.
Table 5.4 ANOVA calculations with 'glass cockpit' hours data.
Analysis of Variance
Source
COVARIATES
for arcsinsqrtrate
Sum of Squares
- Type III Sums of Squares
Df Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value
Glass Hr 0.023337 1 0.023337 0.50 0.4876
MAIN EFFECTS
A:Level of Automat 0.00224076 2 0.00112038 0.02 0.9761
B:Scenario 0.212789 2 0.106394 2.30 0.1310
INTERACTIONS
AB 0.660526 4 0.165132 3.56 0.0276
RESIDUAL 0.787854 17 0.0463443
TOTAL (CORRECTED) 1.69258 26
All F-ratios are based on the residual mean square error.52
5.4 Interpretation of Results
There are 6 columns of data produced by Statgraphics Plus. The left -most column
lists all sources of variation in the performance measure. The second column contains the sum
of square values for each source of variations. The third and the fourth columns present the
degree of freedom values and mean square values for each source of variations. P-value data is
presented in the right-most column, along with F-ratio values in the second column from the
right.
In this study, in order to determine whether a factor had a statistically significant
effect on the CTM performance with a confidence level of 95%, a p-value of less than 0.05
was considered as a significant value. The smaller thenumber, the more significant effect that
a factor had on CTM performance and the morelikely to reject the null hypothesis. The
interpretation of results is organized in accordance to factors that may affect the response
measured including the level of flight deck automation, automation proficiency ('glass cockpit'
hours), and interaction between level of flight deck automation and flying scenarios.
5.4.1 Level of Flight Deck Automation
Table 5.2 clearly shows that the total number of errors made in three levels of flight
deck automation are similar to one another. This similarity suggests that there is nodifference
in CTM performance with different levels of automation. Table 5.4 shows that thelevel of
automation factor has a p-value of 0.9761, which is much greater than the reference value of
0.05. However, due to the fact that the interaction factor of level of automation and scenario
was significant (p-value = 0.0276), the effect of level ofautomation on CTM performance was
significant depending on the flying scenario.
5.4.2 Automation Proficiency
It can be concluded from Table 5.4 that there is not sufficient evidence to reject the
null hypothesis of "Automation proficiency does NOT affect the number of task prioritization
errors". The p-value for this factor is 0.4876. The p-value is greater than 0.05 and therefore,
statistically speaking, the effect of automation proficiency on CTM performance was not
significant.53
5.4.3 Interaction between Flight Deck Automation and Flying Scenario
As shown in Table 5.4, a treatment combination of level of automation and flying
scenario does have a significant effect on the CTM performance (P-value = 0.0276). It is very
interesting to see the fact that the flying scenario factor (P-value = 0.1310) did not affect the
CTM performance significantly while the combination of flying scenario and flight deck
automation affected the CTM performance significantly. What does it tell us?
Looking at figure 5.5 below, there are three lines on the plot representing three
different scenarios with three levels of automation (i.e., 1 for low, 2 for medium, and 3 for
high) on the X-axis and transformed error rate data on the Y-axis. The graph shows that
subjects performed better, that is committed fewer errors, when they flew scenario 1 with
medium automation and performed less well when they flew scenario 1 with high automation.
An inverse condition was shown in scenario 2, where subjects performed better with high
automation and performed poorly with medium automation. The fact that scenario 1 involves
a greater proportion of time in the climb/descent phase of flight and less in the cruise phase of
flight than those in scenario 2 indicates that automation could increase pilots' CTM
performance in certain flying condition and also could reduce pilots' performance in other
flying conditions.
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Figure 5.5 Plot of interaction between automation levels and flying scenarios.54
5.4.4 Single Crew Hours
Further examination of the data suggested that CTM performance could also be
affected by either subjects' total flying hours or subjects' single crew hours. Subjects' single
crew hours refer to the total flying time spent in a single-pilotenvironment. In exploring this
possibility, two additional parameters, subjects' single crew hours and their total flying hours
were also analyzed for their effect on CTM performance.ANOVA calculations with the
addition of these two parameters are presented on Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 ANOVA calculations with 'glass cockpit' hours, single crew hours and total flying
hours data.
Analysis of Variance for arcsinsqrtrate
Source Sum of Squares
COVARIATES
- Type
Df
III Sums of Squares
Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value
Glass Hr 0.0569579 1 0.0569579 1.98 0.1795
Total Hr 0.0599977 1 0.0599977 2.09 0.1690
Single Crew Hr 0.23056 1 0.23056 8.02 0.0126
MAIN EFFECTS
A:Level of Automat 0.00224076 2 0.00112038 0.04 0.9619
B:Scenario 0.212789 2 0.106394 3.70 0.0493
INTERACTIONS
AB 0.41131 4 0.102828 3.58 0.0306
RESIDUAL 0.430977 15 0.0287318
TOTAL (CORRECTED) 1.69258 26
All F-ratios are based on the residual mean square error.
A significant effect of the single crew hours factor on CTM performance is shown in
Table 5.5 (p-value = 0.0126). On the other hand the total flying hours factor did not have
significant effect CTM performance (p-value = 0.1690). By looking at these p-values, a
correlation coefficient value was also computed to describe the degree of linear association
between the 'glass cockpit' hours factor and the total flying hours factor. It turned out thatthe
correlation coefficient value of the two factors was 0.579. The positive value indicates that the
glass cockpit hours factor was directly proportional to total flying hours factor. Since we knew55
that the 'glass cockpit' hours factor did not have a significant effect on CTMperformance, the
ANOVA calculations were modified to include the single crew hours factor only (Table5.6).
Table 5.6 ANOVA calculations with single crew hours data.
Analysis of Variance for arcsinsqrtrate
Source Sum of Squares
COVARIATES
- Type III Sums of Squares
Df Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value
Single Crew Hr 0.314318 1 0.314318 10.75 0.0044
MAIN EFFECTS
A:Level of Automat 0.00224076 2 0.00112038 0.04 0.9625
B:Scenario 0.212789 2 0.106394 3.64 0.0483
INTERACTIONS
AB 0.417999 4 0.1045 3.58 0.0272
RESIDUAL 0.496873 17 0.0292278
TOTAL (CORRECTED) 1.69258 26
All F-ratios are based on the residual mean square error.
After removing the 'glass cockpit' hours data and the total flying hours data from the
ANOVA calculations, the single crew hours factor had a p-value of 0.0044. It appeared that
the single crew hours factor affected CTM performance. In order to see the effect ofsingle
crew hours towards CTM performance, a plot oftask prioritization errors rate vs. single crew
hours is presented in Figure 5.6.0.5
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Figure 5.6 Single crew flying hours vs. mean of error rate.
In general, it can be concluded that subjects who had accumulated a large number of
single crew flying hours performed better in managing tasks compared to those who had
accumulated less hours.
5.5 General Summary
The results of this study suggested a failure to reject one of the initial null hypotheses.
"Automation proficiency does NOT affect the number of task prioritization errors". Therefore.
regardless of pilot's automation proficiency, task prioritization errors still occurs and CTM
performance may not be affected. On the other hand, it was shown that CTM performance was
affected by both, as a result varying level of automation and the combination of flight deck
automation level and flying scenario. The total time spent in single-pilot aircraft also affectec
CTM performance significantly. Table 5.7 presents a summary of conclusions drawn from this
study.57
Table 5.7 Summary of conclusions of the study.
,:',4,, FactOr .6.- -* - rfralliOn
Level of Automation Level of automation affects CTM performance
significantly depending upon flying scenario.
Automation Proficiency (measured in
'glass cockpit' hours)
Cannot conclude automation proficiency
affects CTM performance significantly.
Interaction between level of automation
and flying scenario
Interaction factor affects CTM performance
significantly.
Single-crew flying time Single-crew flying time factor affects CTM
performance significantly.
Although the results of the study suggest a failure to reject one of the initial null
hypotheses, automation proficiency effects on the CTM performance, there were some other
factors that might limit or contribute to the findings of this study. These other factors are
discussed in the following chapter.58
6. DISCUSSION
This chapter discusses the findings in this study. Several other factors including study
limitations and other factors that might contribute to the findings of this study are also
discussed.
6.1 Findings
Based on the data collected and analyses performed on the rate of task prioritization
errors, four major findings were obtained. A discussion foreach of the four findings is
presented below.
6.1.1 Level of Flight Deck Automation and CTM Performance
The first objective of this study was to find the effect of flight deck automation on
CTM performance. The results of the study suggest that the level of flight deck automation
does affect the CTM performance, depending upon the flying scenario.
This finding is closely related to the result of an ASRS study done by Wilson (1997)
on the frequencies of task prioritization errors. Shefound that the task prioritization error
frequency in advanced technology aircraft was higher than the task prioritization error
frequency in traditional aircraft.
6.1.2 Automation Proficiency and CTM Performance
The second objective of this study was to find the effect of pilots' automation
proficiency on CTM performance. Pilot's automation proficiency was assessed solely by their
total hours spent in flying 'glass cockpit' aircraft. The total hours spent in 'glasscockpit'
aircraft had no significant effect on their performance in managing tasks. However, many
other factors need to be taken into consideration in determining pilot's automationproficiency.
The type of automation training they received, age, company policies, and others areexamples
of factors that may contribute to pilots' true automation proficiency. However,what can be
concluded with confidence is the 'glass cockpit' hours cannot be used to predict pilot's59
performance in managing tasks. In other words, pilots with high 'glass cockpit' hours are not
necessarily better at CTM than pilots with low 'glass cockpit' hours.
Despite the fact that 'glass cockpit' hours factor shows no significant effect on CTM
performance, Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5 indicates that fatigue or the knowledge about the FMS
may affect CTM performance. The two subjects who committed more errorscompared to the
other subjects were pilots who were between flights at the time they participated in the study.
Thus the fatigue factor may have contributed to their poorer CTM performance. On the other
hand, the two subjects who committed fewer errors compared to the other subjects were
instructor pilots who teach FMS classes. Hence, automation proficiency in terms of the
knowledge about the FMS may have contributed to their CTM performance. However, this
speculation cannot be justified without further research.
6.1.3 Level of Flight Deck Automation and Flying Scenario Interaction on CTM
Performance
Although the effect of the interaction factor between the level of flight deck
automation and flying scenario on CTM performance was not the objective of this study, it is
an additional important result that needs to be examined.This interaction factor had a
statistically significant effect on CTM performance.
In this study, flying scenario 3 had a rate of task prioritization errors for all three
levels of automation use about equal to the overall mean. Flying scenario 1 had a higher rate
of task prioritization errors when flown in high automation, whereas flying scenario 2 had a
higher rate when flown in lower (i.e., medium) automation. If we look closely at the first 5 to
10 minutes of flight in both scenarios with high automation, subjects made more errors in the
climb phase in flying scenario 1, while on the contrary they made fewer errors in the cruise
phase in flying scenario 2. It is also important to realize the fact that there were 10, 7, and19
task prioritization errors made in climb, cruise, and descent respectively. Furthermore, ofthe
19 errors made in descent phase of flight, 7 were committed in high automation runs,8 were
committed in medium automation runs, and 4 were committed in low automation runs.
Clearly, this finding agrees with Wiener's "clumsy automation" hypothesis.Wiener's (1989)
suggested that flight deck automation may actually increases workload during phases of flight
already characterized by high workload (e.g., climb or descent) and decreases workload during
phases of flight already characterized by low workload (e.g., cruise).60
It is also consistent with the idea that current automation is not always appropriate in
every phase of flight. This finding may be relevant to training onwhen, where, and why pilots
should or should not use automation.
6.1.4 Single-Crew Flying Hours and CTM Performance.
In this study, the single crew flying hours factor had a significant effect on the CTM
performance. By looking at Figure 5.5 in chapter 5, subjects who had high single-crew flying
hours tended to manage their tasks better compared to subjects who had low single-crew
flying hours. However, this result may be explained by the fact that the flight simulator used
for this study is a single-pilot part-task simulator (see the following section). Further research
is required to determine if the single crew flying hours indeed played a critical role in
affecting CTM performance. Nonetheless, this finding suggests that CTM performance could
be improved through more single-pilot flight simulator time in pilot training.
6.2 Study Limitations
In reviewing the results of this study, we need to keep in mind that there were several
limitations or factors that may have affected the results of the study. These limitations mainly
came from the flight simulator used for the study. The use of astatic, motionless flight
simulator and the absence of aural feedback of the aircraft's engine (engine noise) could have
significantly altered the subject's performance in controlling the airspeed, cockpit noise level
being a function of speed. Another limitation of the flight simulator lies in the simulated
aircraft's radio/navigation virtual controls. The act of pushing a mouse controller button to
change the radio frequency or to set a target altitude on the MCP is very different from turning
a real knob in a real airplane. The real knob givesthe pilot aural and tactile feedback on how
the setting is being changed and he/she does not need to look at the knob to adjust it. Inthe
flight simulator, however, the knob was represented as a circle in which the pilot needed to
position the mouse controller's cursor on the proper area and click the mouse controller's
button to change the radio frequency. The same situation applied to engine thrust controls
(throttle). Therefore, these limitations could have reduced the subjects' performance and
affected the results of the study. Also, the fact that this study utilized a single-crew flight
simulator may limit the application of the results to flying environment other than single-crew
operation.61
Another factor that may have affected the results of thestudy was the number of
subjects. Due to time constraints and the limited number of subjectsavailable, only nine pilots
participated in the study. Hence, the distribution of 'glass cockpit' hours waslimited to nine
groups only. Ideally, the more variationin subject's 'glass cockpit' hours would produce richer
data and hence, substantial conclusions may have been obtained.
A final factor was the method for classifying task prioritization errors.The error
classification process was limited and restricted for this study. A rigid A-N-C-Stasks
hierarchy and rigid task performance conditions were chosen to definewhat, where, and when
a task prioritization error occurred.Having this rigid hierarchy certainly affected the way a
task management error was identified. As an example, one could arguethat cross-feeding fuel
from one side of the aircraft to another to correct a fuel imbalance wasin fact an aviate task
rather than a manage the system task, due to the fact that in order tocontrol speed, heading, or
altitude, the fuel imbalance problem must be fixed, otherwise the aircraftwould be unbalanced
and incapable of safe maneuvering.62
7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Research Summary
There are four major findings in this study. First, there is a statistically significant
relationship between the level of flight deck automation and CTM performance depending
upon scenarios in which phases of flight differed. Second, the pilots' automationproficiency,
measured by their 'glass cockpit' hours, had no significant effect on CTM performance. Third,
the combination of level of flight deck automation and flying scenario had a statistically
significant relationship with CTM performance. Lastly, single crew flying hours factor had a
significant effect on CTM performance.
7.2 General Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research
Despite all the study limitations and contributing factors discussed in the previous
chapter, it can be concluded that in any level of automation and in any level of pilot's expertise
task prioritization errors still occur. The level of flight deck automation or automation
proficiency may not solely affect CTM performance and the pilot's automation proficiency
assessed by their 'glass cockpit' hours is not a solid indicator of their CTM performance.
However, CTM performance is affected by a combination several factors including level of
flight deck automation, flying situation and condition, or single crew flying hours. Therefore,
it may be impossible to single out individual factors that affect CTM performance.
Based on these conclusions, there are three recommendations to make. First, when
designing a pilot training program, some justifications on when, where, and why the pilot
should or should not use certain levels of automation should be included. Especially, the pilot
should be taught not to rely on automation in high workload periods (climb/descent), but to
utilize automation in low workload periods (cruise). In other words, it would be better to use
low automation during climb/descent and to use medium or high automation during cruise.
Second, further research should be conducted to find the effect of automation
proficiency on CTM performance based not only on 'glass cockpit' hours factor, but also on
individual differences factors such as the FMS knowledge, level of fatigue, age, gender, and
habit.63
Third, knowing the limitations of the part-task simulator, future flight simulator
studies of CTM should be done in a higher fidelity flight simulator environment.64
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Appendix 2 - Complete Flying ScenariosTRAINING SCENARIO
OSU 123 (MQO - SFO)
Initial Conditions: (in the air on V23)
Lat/Long :45 35' 37.3/ 122 36' 22.5 Flaps : n/a
Altitude : 10000 ft. Heading : 358
Speed : 230 knots V/S : - Ofpm
Events ATC OSU 123
OSU 123 at 10000
OSU 123 at 10mi
before PRB
OSU 123 after PRB
OSU 123 after
SARDO
OSU 123, LA Center, increase
speed to 250, climb and
maintain 1-5-thousand, direct
Paso Robles.
OSU 123, I have an amended
clearance for you. Tell me
when you're ready to copy.
OSU 123, we reroute you to
V248, SARDO, SALINAS, for
traffic, maintain 1-5 thousand.
OSU 123, contact SF Center
128.5.
OSU 123, reduce speed to
240.
Malfunction Introduction Session
OSU at speed 240
OSU 123 at 5 miles
before SNS
OSU 123 at 5 miles
before MOVER
OSU 123 at 10 miles
before SANTY
OSU 123, descend and
maintain 1-3-thousand
OSU 123, at SNS track to 2 -9-
3 radial to SANTY.
OSU 123, descend and
maintain 1-1-thousand, reduce
speed to 230.
OSU 123, KSFO is closed for
fog. Advice when ready to
copy.
At SANTY turn right heading
3-5-9, direct SJC when able,
expect runway 12R.
Descend and maintain 6-
thousand
OSU 123, increase speed to 250,
maintain 15000.
OSU 123, fly V248 to SNS,
maintain 15000.
OSU 123, flight level 15000.
OSU 123, reduce speed to 240.
OSU 123, descend and maintain
13000
OSU 123, 2-9-3 to SANTY.
OSU 123, descend and maintain
11000, reduce speed to 230
OSU 123, turn right 359 at
SANTY. San Jose airport runway
12R, descend to 6000
80SFO  0 
SARDO 
VOR/DME 
Fix/Waypoint 
Start 
End 
Planned Flight Path 
Actual Flight Path 
81 SCENARIO 1
OSU 123 (EUG SEA)
Initial Conditions: (in the a'r, climbing after take-off from R34 EUG)
Lat/Long :
Altitude :
Speed :
Events
OSU 123 at
3700
4407' 15.2 / 123 13' 22.2
3500 ft.
200 knots
ATC
OSU 123, Eugene Departure,
radar contact. Turn left
heading 3-1-0, climb and
maintain 9-thousand. Speed
235.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, turn right heading
HDG 310 3-3-0
OSU 123 atOSU 123, increase speed to
5000 250, direct to Corvallis as
filed.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, contact Seattle
6000 Center 125.8 , climb and
maintain 1-4-thousand.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, Seattle Center,
5 mi beforeproceed to CRAAF heading
CVO for Newberg via V287 for
traffic, maintain 1-4-thousand.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, descend to 1 -2-
20 miles thousand. Seattle is reporting
from UBG 1200 RVR. Reduce speed to
230.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, turn right heading
10 miles 0-3-5, for metering into
from UBG Seattle, descend and
maintain 9-thousand.
OSU 123, Seattle is closed
for fog. You are requested to
land at Portland. Advice when
you are ready to copy.
Turn left heading 295 to
intercept V165, fly direct
SCAPO for runway lOR
approach. Descend to 4-
thousand.
Terminate after pilot fixed fuel imbalance
Flaps :
Heading :
V/S :
OSU 123
OSU 123, turn left
heading 310,
maintain 9000.
OSU 123, turn right
heading 330
OSU 123, increase
speed to 250, direct
to Corvallis as filed.
82
n/a
340
1200fpm
Seattle Center, OSU
123 climb and
maintain 14000.
OSU 123, CRAAF,
Newberg via V287,
maintain 14000.
OSU 123, descend to
12000 and reduce
speed 230.
OSU 123, turn right
035, maintain 9000.
Roger, OSU 123, turn
left heading 295
proceed to SCAPO,
descend and
maintain 4000,
expect to land at
10R.
Malfunction
While intercepting V481
& reaching 250 kn:
Ml: Line 2 contactor off
Before ATC call:
M2: Right pack off.
After ATC call:
M3: Line 1 contactor
off.
Bus tie 3 contactor off.
At Alt 12300:
M4: Bus tie 2 contactor
off.
Before ATC call :
M5: Boost pump 2 off.
M6: Fuel imbalance.CRAAF
SCAPO
MCCOY
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
CVO
Malfunction 3:
Line contactor 1 & Bus tie 3
Malfunction 2: Right pack
PDX
SEA
Malfunction 6: Fuel imbalance
UBG
Malfunction 5: Boost pump 2
Malfunction 4: Bus tie 2
Malfunction 1: Line contactor 2
(-)EUG
0 VOR/DME
A FixNVaypoint
Start
III End
Planned Flight Path
Actual Flight Path
8384
SCENARIO 2
OSU 123 (PSC SEA)
Initial Conditions: (in the air on V204)
Lat/Long :46 27' 1 / 119 54' 6 Flaps : n/a
Altitude : 14000 ft. Heading : 269
Speed : 230 knots V/S : Ofpm
Events ATC OSU 123 Malfunction
OSU 123 at
14000
OSU 123, Seattle Center,
increase speed to 240, climb
and maintain 1-5-thousand.
OSU 123, increase
speed to 240,
maintain 15000.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, at Yakima, turn OSU 123, at YKM
10mi beforeright track to 3-1-0 radial to turn right track 3-1-0
YKM THICK, for traffic. to THICK, V298.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, increase speed toOSU 123, speed 250,After ATC call:
YKM 250, maintain 1-5-thousand.1-5-thousand. Fl: Bus tie contactor 2
off.
Reaching 250:
F2: Left compressor
motor off.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, increase speed toOSU 123 speed 260,After ATC call:
10mi from260, fly V187 to RADDY V187, maintain F3:Bus tie contactor 3
PERTT from THICK, maintain 1 -5-
thousand.
15000. off.
Line 2 contactor off.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, from RADDY, flyOSU 123 V4 from
20 miles
from
V4 to Seattle as filed. RADDY.
RADDY
OSU 123 atOSU 123, reduce speed to OSU 123, reduce Reaching 240:
15 miles
from
240, descend to 1 -2-
thousand.
speed to 240,
descend to 12000.
F4: 270V DC Bus 1&3
off.
RADDY
OSU 123 atOSU 123, descend to 10- OSU 123, descend to
5 miles
from
thousand. 10000.
RADDY
OSU 123 atOSU 123, descend and OSU 123, Seattle Before ATC Call:
HUMPP maintain 8-thousand, contactapproach descend toF5: Boost pump 2 off.
Seattle approach 119.2. 8000.
OSU 123 atOSU 123, Seattle approachOSU 123, turn left After ATC call:
5miles turn left heading 2-5-3 at heading 253 at F6: Fuel imbalance.
before BLAKO, prepare for ILS BLAKO, ILS runway
BLAKO approach on runway 34-R. 34-R
Terminate after pilot turned left at BLAKOSEA
0,.(3LAKO
Malfunction 6: Fuel imbalance
`,UMPP
A
Malfunction 5: Boost pump 2
RADDY
THICK
Malfunction 4:
270V DC Bus 1&3
PERTT
VOFt/DME
p Fix/Waypoint
Start
End
Planned Flight Path
Actual Flight Path
CHINS
ELN
Malfunction 3: Bus tie 3 & Line 2 contactor
SELAH
Malfunction 2: Left compressor
Malfunction 1: Bus tie 2
YKM PSCSCENARIO 3
OSU 123 (SEA EUG)
Initial Conditions: (in the air on V23)
Lat/Long :
Altitude :
Speed :
Events
OSU 123 at
14000
OSU 123 at
10mi before
OSWEG
OSU 123 at
10mi before
UBG
OSU 123 at
10mi from
BREAF
OSU at
13000
OSU 123 at
10mi before
CVO
OSU 123 at
5mi before
CVO
OSU 123
on V481
OSU 123 at
15 miles
from EUG
OSU 123 at
5000
45 35' 37.3 / 122 36' 22.5
14000 ft.
230 knots
ATC
OSU 123, Seattle Center,
climb to 1-5-thousand,
maintain 230 knots.
OSU 123, you are requested
to turn right to Newberg via
V182 at OSWEG, increase
speed to 240, maintain 1-5
thousand.
OSU 123, fly V495 to
Corvallis, increase speed to
260.
OSU 123, descend and
maintain 1-3-thousand.
OSU 123, descend and
maintain 9-thousand.
OSU 123, reduce speed to
230.
OSU 123, fly V481 to EUG.
OSU 123, contact cascade
approach 119.6.
OSU 123 cascade approach,
descend and maintain 6000,
reduce speed to 210.
OSU 123, descend to 4-
thousand, turn left heading 1-
1-0 for the localizer.
OSU 123, turn right heading 1-
6-0 to join localizer. Descend
and maintain 3000. Cleared
ILS runway 16.
Terminate after pilot turned to heading 160
Flaps :
Heading :
V/S :
n/a
175
Ofpm
OSU 123
OSU 123, to 15000,
maintain 230.
OSU 123, going to
Newberg via V182,
increase speed to 240,
maintain 15000.
OSU 123, direct to
CVO, via V495,
increase speed to 260.
OSU 123 descend and
maintain 1-3-thousand.
OSU 123, descend to
9000.
OSU 123, reduce
speed to 230.
OSU 123, V481 to
EUG.
Eugene approach, OSU
123 at 10000.
OSU 123, descend to
6000 and reduce speed
to 210.
OSU 123, descend to
4000, turn left heading
110.
OSU 123, turn right
heading 160, maintain
3000 until established.
Cleared ILS runway 16.
86
Malfunction
After ATC call:
Dl: Left
compressor motor
off.
After ATC call:
D2: Line 1
contactor off.
At Alt 13500:
D3:Bus tie
contactor 2 off.
Line 2 contactor off.
Just before CVO:
D4: 270V DC Bus
1&3 off.
Before ATC call:
D5: Bus tie
contactor 2.
270V DC Bus 1&3
off.
Before ATC call:
D6: Boost pump 2
off.Malfunction 2:
Line 1 contactor
UBG
Malfunction 3:
Bus tie 2 and
Line 2 contactor
BREAF
/
ADLOW
/
Malfunction 4:
270V DC Bus 1&3
CVO
Malfunction 5:
270V DC Bus 1&3 and
Bus tie 2
Malfunction 6:
Boost pump 2
EUG
OSWEG
QSEA
BTG
PDX
Malfunction 1: Left compressor motor
O VOR/DME
Fix/Waypoint
Start
End
Planned Flight Path
Actual Flight Path
8788
Appendix 3 - OSU Internal Review Board Document89
Evaluation of Task Management Performance in
Different Levels of Cockpit Automation
Supplement to an application for the approval of the OSU IRB
18 November1998
1. Significance of Project
According to Boeing's statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents, cockpit crew problems
accounted for70.5%of the149hull loss accidents with known causes in the worldwide commercial jet
fleet over the period1988-1997.In earlier studies completed at Oregon State, we have determined that a
significant number of the errors that led to these accidents were related to task prioritization. In a
dynamic and complex commercial cockpit environment, flightcrews are often required to accomplish
multiple tasks concurrently with a limited quantity of attention. An attention allocation or task
prioritization error is simply an error made by flightcrew when they perform lower priority tasks as
opposed to higher priority tasks, where priority is determined by the aviate, navigate, communicate, and
manage systems task ordering known to most pilots. Although level of automation has been suggested
as one factor influencing the likelihood of task prioritization errors, there has so far been just one study,
a study of aircraft incident reports, directed toward confirming that hypothesis.
The objective of this research is to determine the effect of level of automation on the frequency of task
prioritization errors in a more controlled environment. In addition to level of automation, automation
proficiency and head-down time factors will be investigated as well.
2. Methods and Procedures
While the ideal environment for conducting such a study would be in a full-mission simulator, budget
and time preclude this option. On the other hand, an abstract laboratory setting would lack the fidelity to
achieve at least face validity and the results of such a study could not be extrapolated to the real flight
deck. Instead, a part-task simulator study will be conducted. This provides a compromise between the
extremes mentioned above and if successful, will lay the groundwork for full-mission simulator studies
later.
A single-pilot, part-task simulator called the Stone Soup Simulator (SSS) will be utilized in this study.
It models a two-engine commercial jet transport with autoflight systems and runs on a Silicon Graphics
Indigo 2 UNIX-based workstation. The SSS represents a distributable version of the miniature version
of Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (miniACFS) part-task flight simulator which has been used for
anced automation and communication research at the NASA Ames Research Center. A serial mouse
and/or BG system flybox (three degree of freedom joystick with integrated buttons and levers) are also
part of the simulator system for subjects to interact with the system.
Subjects will use the simulator to "fly" short segments of simulated commercial transport missions.
Several events, such as diversion to another airport, last minute clearance change by air traffic control
(ATC), and equipment malfunctions will be incorporated in the scenarios. These events will be
designed in such a way that the nature and number of tasks involved represent typical flying conditions.
Subjects will fly the scenarios in both high and low automation modes. The high automation mode will
involve the use of the simulator's Flight Management Systems (FMS), Mode Control Panel (MCP), and
autopilot systems. The low automation mode will require the subjects to fly manually using VOR/DME
(i.e., conventional radio) navigation. Task prioritization errors will be counted by noting the number of
times the subjects attend to lower priority tasks at the expense of satisfactory performance of higher
priority tasks.90
The experimenter will train each subject in the operation of the part-task simulator before conducting
real data collection. This training will take approximately one hour. During each experimental run,
subjects will perform aircraft control and system management tasks in a simulated flight scenario (e.g.,
Eugene to Seattle). The experimenter will serve as Air Traffic Controller (ATC), giving directions and
clearances to subjects, as well as initiating simulated aircraft system malfunctions. The system will
track and record subject flight control actions (e.g., stick movements) and subsystem management (e.g.,
button pushes), as well as aircraft state information every second. The experimenter will then review the
data collected with the aid of spreadsheet software to determine the number of task prioritization errors
made. The experimental runs will also be video taped. The camera will be positioned to record portions
of the computer screen and the subjects' manual control actions. No physiological variables will be
measured.
Following each experimental run, the experimenter will review the videotape with the subject, asking
him/her to explain his/her intent at various points in the scenario.
3. Benefits and Risks to Subjects
Subjects will gain a better understanding of allocating their attention in a complex environment of a
highly automated modern commercial jet aircraft. They will learn basic human factors engineering
concepts and how these principles may be applied in system design. In addition, they will also have an
opportunity to enhance their automation skills and to know about other types of aircraft automation.
Subjects will receive no monetary compensation for their participation. There will be no rewards
promised or given for "good" performance and no penalties threatened or levied for "poor"
performance.
Risks to the subjects will be minimal. There may be periods of psychological stress while the subjects
are performing multiple concurrent tasks, however the amount of stress experiencedshould be no more
than that encountered while playing a video game.
4. Subject Population
Ten to twenty airline pilots will be used for the study. The subjects will be recruited from the Portland,
Oregon area using an ad in the airline's pilot newsletter. The text of the ad is as follows:
Airline Pilots Needed
for Automation Research
Airline pilots are needed for flight deck automation research at Oregon State University (OSU).
Volunteers will assist in the evaluation of flight deck automation in a part-task simulator. DASH-8 or
other glass cockpit experience is required. The study will be conducted in late March 1999 to April
1999 at Horizon Air Flight Operations Center in Portland It will take approximately 3-4 hours on a
single day for each participant.
Your participation in this study would be greatly appreciated and it would make a significant
contribution to important research. Other benefits to you include an opportunity to be involved in
cutting edge aviation research as well as to enhance your automation skills and to learn about other
types of aircraft automation.
If interested, please fill out and mail a self-addressed-stamped postcard below. Should you have any
questions, call Candy Suroteguh at (541)737-5240 or send e-mail to suroteca @engr.orst.edu.
We will also place a recruiting poster in crew rooms. The text of the poster is attached.91
5. Informed Consent
A copy of the current version of the informed consent document is attached. The researchers will notify
the IRB of any changes.
6. Method for Obtaining Informed Consent
Before data collection an informed consent form will be given to the subject, and after reading it, the
subject will be asked to sign if he/she agrees to be part of the study.
7. Method for Maintaining Anonymity/Confidentiality
Any information pertaining to the subjects' identities will not be used in the study. A randomly
generated identification number will be assigned to each individual and used to record associated data.
All records (including video tapes) will be destroyed after being stored in a confidential manner under
the researchers' supervision for three years.
8. Questionnaires
A pre-test questionnaire will be used to collect demographic information, which will be compiled to aid
users of the research results in assessing their validity and transferability to practical situations. A copy
of the pre-test questionnaire is attached.
A post-test questionnaire will be used to assess subjective preferences by the subjects for the different
level of automation modes and to assess the suitability and thoroughness of the training. A copy of the
post-test questionnaire is attached.
9. Other Approvals
No other approvals are required.
10. Proposal
This is not part of a proposal.92
Department of Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering
Oregon State University
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
I understand that I will participate in flight deck automation research conducted under the supervision
of Dr. Ken Funk of the Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering Department. I understand that in this
experiment I will use my aviation knowledge and skills to fly a computer-based, part-task flight
simulator. After a one hour training session I will fly a set of flight scenarios. The entire experiment
should last no longer than four hours.
I am aware that this is an unpaid experiment. Although physiological risks during the experiment are
minimal, I understand that I will experience a level of psychological stress comparable to that of
playing a video game during the experiment. While the experiment is being run, the evaluator will
video tape the flight operation and later ask questions for data collection purposes.
My identity will not be released to any other persons, organizations, or publications. All references to
subjects in this study will be encoded and kept confidential, and all identity related information
(including video tapes) destroyed within three years of the experiment.
I understand that any questions concerning aspects or rights related to this experiment should be
directed to Dr. Ken Funk at 541-737-2357. I understand that Oregon State University does not provide
compensation or medical treatment in the event the subject is injured as a result of participation in this
study.
I understand that participation is voluntary, and my refusal to participate will not result in penalties or
loss of benefits that I am otherwise entitled. My signature below indicates that I have read and that I
understand the procedures described above and give my informed and voluntary consent to participate
in this study. I understand that I will receive a signed copy of this consent form.
Subject's Signature Date Signed
Subject's Name
Subject's Address
Subject's Phone Number93
Pre-Test Questionnaire
Subject # Date:
Current seat:
captain
first officer
flight engineer
other:
Flying experience
List all aircraft you have flown:
Current aircraft:
Total flying time: hours
Total DASH-8 time: hours
Total time in other "glass cockpit" (FMS equipped aircraft): hours
Certificates/Ratings
private
instrument
multi-engine
commercial
CFI
ATP
F/E
other:
Caffeine and medications
Rate your level of caffeine consumption today (coffee, tea, cola, etc.):
above average for me
about average for me
below average for me
Have you recently taken any medication that is likely to affect your flying anddecision making skills?
yes
no94
Automated Systems
Rate your level of familiarity with the following automated systems. 0 means you are not familiar with
the system at all, 4 means you are very familiar with it and use it routinely.
Flight management Systems (FMS) 0123 4
Advanced Autopilot (e.g., with heading altitude, and vertical speed select) 0123 4
Automated warning and alerting system (e.g., EICAS) 0123 495
Post-Test Questionnaire
Subject # Date:
Did you receive adequate training to serve the purpose of this experiment, as you understand it?
Explain.
Rate the overall difficulty of the flying in this experiment, as compared to your real flying
experience.
much easier
easier
roughly equivalent
more difficult
much more difficult
Explain:
Which level of automation did you prefer?
low (joystick only)
medium (with MCP)
high (with MCP and full FMS)
Explain:
What other comments do you have concerning the research or your experience with the
experiment?96
Appendix 4 - Sample of Raw Data97
FILENAME:: DC_ 040699_1156.hfe LOW
START TIME: Tue Apr 6 11:56:29 1999
SCENE FILENAME: osul.dat
FREEZE ON
11:57:14.000 FREEZE OFF
0
2 1
=4-47i,
1 3500 2 21
-$16a
0
-1-...1-TAft 4...
3800244.1804:124.22
1
2
it.o,
2 350.;LW 340 0.4118 2 2 9999.629
3600344.1814 - 123.223500 200 340-14.2118 2 2 2 1 1 2 235002j2 09998.885
3600444.1823-123.223499 200 340-34.5118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2;2 09998.141
3600544.1833-123.223499 200 34047.5118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2;2 09997.396
3600644.1843-123.223498 200 34053.7118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09996.652
3600744.1853 -123.223497 200 340-56.4118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09995.908
3600844.1862 -123.223496 2001340-57.3118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2:09995.164
3600944.1872 -123.223495 200 340-57.1118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 22'09994.42
3601044.1882 -123.223494 200 340-56.3118 2 2 2 1 1
li
2
2
2
2
3500
3500
2 2;0
2 2-0
9993.676
9992.932 3601144.1892 -123.223493 2003401 -55 1118 2 2 2 1
3601244 1901 -123.223492 200 340-53 6118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09992.188
36013144.1911 -123.223491 201 340-52.11181 212 2 1 1 2 23500, 2 2 0]9991 443
36014' -123.223491 201 340-50.51181 222 1 1 2 23500 2 2 019990 699
36015'44.1931 -123.223490 201 340-48.94118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09989 955
36015.44 194-123.223489 201 340-47 4118,2'2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09989.211
36016,44.195 -123.223488 201 340-45.9118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09988 467
36017'44.1959 -123.22348ET201 340-44 4118 2
-4
2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09987 723
3601844.1969 -123.223487 201,340-42.9118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 019986 979 CO-1
36019: -123.22:3486 2011340-41.511181 212 2 1 1 2 2350012 2 019986.234
3602044.1989 123.223485 201 340-401118 2 2 2 1 2 23500,2 2 09985.49
1-1 3602144.19981 123.223485 201 340-38.8118 2 2 2 1 2 23500,2 2 09984.746
3602244.2008 - 123.223484 201 340-37.5118 22 2 1 2 23500 2 2 01 9984.002
3602344.2018-123.223483 201 340-36.3118 2 2 2 1 2 23500 2 2 09983.258
3602444.2028 - 123.2234831201 340-46.8118 2 2 2 112 23500 2 2 09982.514
3602544.2038-123.223482 201 340,-76.1118 22
2
2
2 1
2
2
2
2
3500
3500
2
21
21
21
0
0
9981.77
9981 025 3602644.2047-123.223481 201 339-67.8118 2
3602744.2057-123.223480 201 338-64.6118 22 2 1 2 235002'2!09980 281
3602844.2067-123.223478 201 338-67.9118 2 2 2 2 23500 22,09979.537
3602944.2077 -123.223477 201 337-68.7118 2 2 2 2 235002'2,09978 793
3603044.2087-123.223476 202 336-55.2118 2 2 2 1 1 2 235002:2!09977.803
36031!44.2096-123.223476 203 33625.9118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2:09976.314
9974.639 3603244.2106-123.223478 204 335323.4118 2 2 1 2 235002!2 0
36033,44.2116-123.223487 205 334670.2118 2 2 2 1 2 235002:2 09972.962
3603444.2126-123.22!3499 206 333810.9118 2 2 2 1 1 2123500 212 09971.286
3603544.2136-123.223513 206 332854.3118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 212'09969.61
3603644.2146 - 123.2213527 207 330839.611812 2 2 1 1 2 235002'2 09967.935
3603744.2156 - 123.2213541 207 329862.9118 2 2 2 2 23500 21 2109966.259
3603844.2166- 123.22'3556 208 328911118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2109964 583
3603944.2176 - 123.2213572 209 327927.9118 2 2 2 1 1 2 235002' 2109962 908
3604044.2186 - 123.22:3587 209 326933.5118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 21 2109961 197
3604144.2196 - 123.23:3603 210 325964.1118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2109959 204
3604244.2206 - 123.23'3619 212 3241007118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2109957.188
3604344.2216-123 233636 213 3231033118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 21 2109955 173
3604444.2225 - 123.2313654 214 3211056118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2109953 157
3604544.2235 - 123.23!3671 215 3201083118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2109951 142
3604644.2245 - 123.2313690 216 3191113118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2'109949 127
3604744.2255 -123 23 '
1
3709 217 3181144118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 212,09947 11398
3504844.2265-123.233728 217 3171175118 2 22 1 1 2 23500 2 2 0 9945.1
3604944.2275-123.233748 218 3161205118 22 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09943 086
3605044.2285-123.233768 219 3151235118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09941.073
3605144.2294-123.233789 220 3141262118 22 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09939.062
3605244.2304-121233810 221 3131281118 22 2 1 1 2 23500 2 2 09937.05
3605344.2314-123.233832 222 3121301118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 209935.038
3605444.2323-123.233853 222 31113231182 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 209933.028
3605544.2333-123.233876 223 30913471182 2 2 1 1 2 23500 2 209931.019
3605644.2342-123.233898 224 30813651182 2 2 1 1 2 23700 2 2 09929.009
3605744.2351 -123.233921 224 30813231182 2 2 1 1 2 23700 2 2 0 9927
3605844.2361 -123.243944 2253081420118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23700 2 2 09924.992
36059 44.237 -123.243967 226 3081442118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23700 2 2 09922.984
36060 44.238-123.243991 226 3061450118 2 2 2 1 1 2 23900 2 2 09920.979
3606144.2389-123.244016 227 3081460118 2 2 2 1 1 2 24400 2 2 09918.973C0 -2
3606244.2398-123.244040 228 3081476118 2 21 2 1 1 2 24800 2 2 09916.968
3606344.2408-123.244065 228 3081495118 2 2 2 1 1 2 25200 2 2 09914.964
3606444.2417-123.244090 229 3081514118 2 2 2 1 1 2 25600 2 2 09912.96
3606544.2427 -123,244115 229 3081514118 2 2 2 1 1 2 25800 2 2 09910.957
3606644.2436-123.244141 230 3081544118 2 2 2, 1 1 2 26300 2 2 09908.955
3606744.2446-123.244167 231 3081568118 2 2 2 1 1 2 26800 2 2 09906.953
3606844.2455-123.244193 231 3081585118 2 2 2: 1 1 2 211100 2 2 09904.953
36069,
360 TO*
44.2465-123.244220 232 30816051118, 2 21 2 1 1 2 211000 2 2 09902.953
44.2474-123.254247 232.30816231118 2 2 2 1 1 2 210500 2 2 09900.955
36071144.2484-123 251- 4274 2333081 1640118 2 2,2.
2 1 1 2 210100 2 2 09898.957
3607244.2493 -123.25 .4301 233 3081656118
30811671118
30816861118"
3081701118'
2
2
2
2 1 1,2 29900 2 2 09896.96
36073144.2503-123.254329 234
-123.2514357 2341
-123 254385 234
2,
21
2 1 1 2 29800 2 2 09894.964
_,
1
3607444.2513 2 1 112 29400 2 2 09892.969 -1
36075,44.2522 2 21 2 1 1 2 29100 2 2 09890.975
3607644.2532- 123.25 4414 235 3081714118 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09888.981i
3607744.2542-123.25.4442,235.308" 1725,118. 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09886.989
36078144,2551 123.254470 236 30816811118 2.2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09884.998
3607944.2561 -123.254499 23613091689118 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09883.008
36080144.2571 -123.25.4527 236 3101673118,2'2 2 1
4555 237316-1-1677118 2,2 2 1
1
1
2
2
2
2
9000
9000
2
2
2
2
0
0
9881.019
9879.03 3608144.2581 -123.26
36082144.2591 -123.264583 23713111681118 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09877.043
3608344.2601 -123.26146111238 3121691,118 212 2 1 1 2 29000 22 09875.057
3608444.2611 -123.264639 23813131699118 212 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09873.07
3608544.2621 -123.264667238, 31417081181 21212 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09871.086
3608644.2632-123.264696 23913151717118! 21 2,2 1
1181 212 2 1
1
1
2
2
2
2
9000
9000
2
2
2
2
0
0
9869.102
9867.269 3608744.2642-123.264724 239 3151717
36088442653-123.264753 239 3161708118,2!2 2 2 29000 2 2 09865.511
3608944.2663-123.264781 239, 3171687118 2,2 21 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09863 755
; 3609044.2674-123.26
-123.26
4809 239 3181681
4837123913191 1675
118
118
2 2 2, 1
212 2 1
1
1
2
2
2
2
9000
9000
2
2
2
2
0
0
9861.999
9860.245 3609144.2685
3609244.2696-123.264865239 32011671
1671
118
118
2'212: 1
2 22' 1
1
1
2
2
2
2
9000
9000
2
2
2
2
0
0
9858.491
9856.739 3609344.2707-123.2648931239 3211
3609444.2718-123.264921 239 3221167111812 2 2 1 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09854.987
3609544.2729-123.274949 239 323.16711118 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09853.237
36096 44.274-123.274977 239
239
3241673
32511674
118 2;2
118 2 2
21 1
2 1
1
1
2
2
2
2
9000
9000
2
2
2
2
0
0
9851.487
9849.739 3609744.2751 - 123.275004
36098144.2763-123.275032 239 32611675118 2 22' 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09847 991
3609944,2774-123.275060 239 3271677118
118
2 2
212
2 1
21 1
1
1
2
2
2
2
9000
9000
2
2
2
2
0
0
9846 245
9844 499 3610044.2786-123.275088 239 3281667
3610144.2797-123 2751161239 32816921182t2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09842.755
3610244.2809-123.275144 239 3291702118 2 2 21 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09841.011
36103 44.282-123.275173 239 3301703118 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09839.269
3610444.2832-123.275201 239 3311704118 2 21 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09837 526 C0 -3
3610544.2844-123.275229 239 3321705118 2 2 21, 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09835.786
3610644.2855-123.275258 239 3331705118 20 2'' 1
1
1 2 29000 2 2 09834.03199
3610744.2867-123.275286 239 3331653118 2 0 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09832.31
3610844.2879 -123.275313 239 3331690118 20 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09830.589
3610944.2891 -123.275342 239 3331727118 2 0 2 1 1 2 29000 2 2 09828.869
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I IIII I I
37126 45.454 -122.748946 225 334-45.9126 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 0 08910.904
3712745.4551 -122.748945 225 333-45.9126 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 008910.115
3712845.4563-122.748944 225 332-45.9126 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 20 08909.326
3712945.4575-122.748943 225 331-45.9126 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 0 08908.537
3713045.4587 -122.748943 225 330-45.8126 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 0 08907.748
3713145.4598-122.748942 225 328-45.8126 2 2 2 1 1 2 29000 2 0 08906.959